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Summary 
The development of medical knowledge has resulted in a demand in society for donor 
organs, but the recruitment of donor organs for transplantation is difftcult. This paper aims 
to provide some general insights into the complex interaction processes involved. A laissez- 
faire policy, in which market forces are relied on, is not acceptable from an ethical and legal 
point of view in most western European countries. Especially at the demand side of the 
exchange of donor organs, commercialism is to be opposed. We judge the use of commercial 
incentives at the supply side less unacceptable in theory but not feasible in western European 
countries. Since market forces are deemed unacceptable as instruments for coordinating 
demand and supply of donor organs, donor procurement has to be considered as a collective 
good, and therefore governments are faced with the responsibility of making sure that alterna- 
tive interaction and distribution mechanisms function. The role of organ procurement agen- 
cies (OPAs) in societal interaction concerning postmortem organ donation is described using 
a two-dimensional conceptualisation scheme. Medical aspects of living organ donation are 
described. An international comparative description of legal systems to regulate living organ 
donation in western European countries completes this survey. 
Organ donation; Transplantation; Hospitals 
1. Introduction 
The necessity for the transmission of donor organs results from a need in 
society to increase the quantity and the quality of life of members of society 
suffering from end-stage organ failure. The development of medical knowl- 
edge has resulted in safe and applicable transplantation technologies. Kidney 
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transplantation spread around the world in the 196Os, as did heart transplan- 
tation in the 1980s. Both kidney and heart transplantations are technologies 
of proven safety, efficacy and acceptable cost-effectiveness relationship. 
Liver transplantation, pancreas transplantation and several variants of lung 
transplantation are diffusing too, but on their acceptability consensus is less 
firmly established. 
Since the benefit to the individual patient from a transplant can be 
substantial, a demand exists for donor organs. The actual demand depends 
to a large extent on the current state of particular technologies and on the 
policy-making process guiding the diffusion of transplantation technologies. 
Kidney transplantation is a mature technology. Although technological 
developments, such as new immunosuppressive drugs and better storage sol- 
utions, result in improved medical effectiveness, the technology is widely dif- 
fused. Gradually it became feasible to transplant kidneys in older patients 
and in patients with a more complex medical history. The waiting lists for 
donor kidneys are therefore still growing. In the Netherlands the waiting list 
for kidney transplantation increased from 648 in 1980 to 1343 in 1990 [I]. 
Waiting lists for other types of transplantation, such as heart transplants, are 
also growing. 
The formal status of different kinds of transplantation in the Netherlands 
differs as a consequence of decisions made by the Dutch health authorities. 
In the 1970s kidney transplantation was included in the standard national 
health fund provisions. Based on technology assessments of heart [2] and 
liver [3] transplantation, health authorities decided to include heart and liver 
transplantation in the reimbursement package [4]. Pancreas and lung 
transplantations are not yet included in the reimbursement system as a 
routine treatment. 
The recruitment of donor organs for transplantation is difficult. This 
paper aims to provide some general insights into the complex interaction 
processes involved. First, a laissez-faire policy is described, in which market 
forces are relied on. It is argued that for a number of ethical and legal reasons 
a simple market process is unacceptable in western European countries. 
Then systems of decision-making on the demand side are analysed. Finally 
we focus on systems and sub-systems developed to regulate the decision- 
making processes on the supply side of the transfer of donor organs. 
2. Laissez-faire 
Let us, for the sake of argument, explore the option of laissez-faire on the 
‘organ market’. In this option, donor organs could be offered on a private 
market at a set price and be sold to buyers who are able to pay the price. 
The market mechanism is considered in general to be an efficient mecha- 
nism, since it minimises costs of information, guarantees freedom and en- 
sures a high individual involvement. Since utility and profit maximisation are 
important goals for most individuals, the market system provides a 
framework in which the advantages to individuals of the availability of 
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donor organs can be reflected in a price. Scarcity of donor organs will be 
reflected in high market prices; this could provide an impetus for individuals 
to supply those donor organs during life or after death. Once a market price 
has been set for donor organs, profit-making institutions could step in to 
carry out the distribution functions involved, such as bridging differences in 
time and place of supply and demand and organising the intermediate pro- 
cesses involved. 
The laissez-faire solution is not completely fiction: it is the reality in some 
developing countries. Reddy reported that payment for kidneys from non- 
related living donors is not unusual in India [5]. It is not always easy to con- 
demn the selling of organs in situations of scarcity, as was illustrated by 
Radcliffe’s case of a Turkish father selling his kidney to pay for an expensive 
life-saving operation for his daughter [6]. There is some evidence of the ex- 
istence of market pressure in some developed countries as well. In the 
Netherlands public opinion was shocked in 1989 when a commercial agent 
advertised his reimbursement rates for kidneys [7]. Before condemning this 
kind of transaction, we should analyse the market forces involved. 
In the policy arena, vote maximisation plays a role in determining policy. 
This seems to induce strong statements about the acceptability of commercial 
exchange of donor organs and the desirability of legislation prohibiting those 
activities. In the United States, where commercial freedom is an important 
value, the Congress adopted the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984, in 
which commercial markets for organs were outlawed [8]. In the Netherlands, 
reports about commercial activities immediately provoked a strong reaction 
by the Secretary of Health. In the proposed Dutch Transplantation Law, 
commercial transfers of donor organs are forbidden. Commercialisation of 
donor exchange is seen as immoral and as conflicting with the basic values 
of the legal system. Although the views of the politicians probably reflect 
widely held values, they might also appeal to fundamental psychological 
factors, prohibiting a rational judgement about the processes involved. 
Nevertheless it could be argued that the market system could be used at 
the supply side of the market [9]. Many are in favour of remuneration or 
reimbursement of donor organ procurement activities performed in hospi- 
tals. An analytical approach has to focus on the demand and supply side of 
a market for donor organs separately, since the decisions involved are com- 
pletely different. 
Demand side 
Patients searching for a donor organ are willing to pay a certain price for 
that organ. Some of these patients might be willing to pay from their private 
means, but an insurance company might also be willing to provide money for 
a donor organ as part of their coverage. Since a kidney transplant can save 
substantial health care costs, because dialysis will no longer be necessary, 
paying for a donor kidney can increase the profits of the insurance company 
[lo]. This willingness to pay can include amounts of money large enough to 
compensate for supplying a donor organ. 
From a consumer point of view, the freedom of the patient to buy or not 
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to buy is severely restricted, since the quality of life, or even life itself, of the 
consumer is conditional on the availability of a donor organ. Purchasing 
power could therefore be the predominant decision factor in allocating 
donor organs. This is contrary to the basic right to health care for every 
citizen, which is incorporated in many western European institutions. In the 
Netherlands article 22 of the Constitution embodies this provision. 
Moreover the Constitution guarantees equal access to health care provisions 
for all citizens. So at the demand side of the theoretical market for donor 
organs, the allocation has to be made by a non-commercial process of priori- 
ty setting. Intermediate agents, e.g. hospitals or organ procurement agencies 
(OPAs), have to ensure that the allocation of donor organs is performed 
according to the standards set by society. 
Supply side 
Once intermediate agencies, whether they be hospitals or OPAs, are 
involved, the recruitment of donor organs implies decision-making between 
these intermediate agencies and people willing to make organs available dur- 
ing their life or after death. In principle, every member of society could be 
an organ donor. For a sub-set of organs, mainly kidneys but also partial 
livers, donation during life is medically feasible. Decision-making about live 
donation differs in a fundamental way from decision-making about 
postmortem organ donation. 
The market system is considered inappropriate for allocating donor 
organs to patients. Therefore other allocation mechanisms have to be used 
that do not allocate donor organs according to the ability to pay. Those 
alternative decision-making systems necessarily involve an agency or a com- 
plex of agencies responsible for the allocation process. 
But perhaps we could use the market mechanism to ensure an optimal sup- 
ply of donor organs. One might argue that the health risks involved for the 
donor are prohibitive, but we are negotiating about health risks in many 
cases. Some occupations imply a health risk, as is the case for a military pilot, 
and we do not think those jobs unacceptable. In such a case health risks can 
be reflected in higher wages. An argument against a market system for donor 
organs could be that a minimum quality standard has to be ensured. But that 
aspect could easily be enforced by minimum standards, in the same way that 
we ensure that our food is healthy or our electrical appliances are safe. 
3. Decision-making systems about the allocation of donor organs 
Within western Europe a number of organ procurement agencies exist. 
Eurotransplant coordinates the decision-making process in the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Austria; UK Transplant coordinates 
organ procurement in the United Kingdom; France Transplant and the 
Rhone Mediterante Services cover France; and, finally, Scandia Transplant 
coordinates donor procurement in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. These 
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non-profit agencies facilitate the international exchange of donor organs in 
cooperation with the hospitals in which donor organs become available [ ill. 
One important raison d’etre of these OPAs is that the medical effectiveness 
of transplantation increases by matching the similarity in tissue types of 
recipient and donor organ as closely as possible. 
The OPAs play an important role in coordinating the decision-making 
process in which donor organs are allocated. It is the OPAs’ responsibility 
to apply a system of decision rules in allocating postmortem donor organs 
to patients on the waiting list. However, donor organs that will become avail- 
able in transplant centres are sometimes offered first to patients treated in 
that centre; the remaining donor kidneys are offered to patients on the 
waiting list of the OPA. 
If, in their discussions with the hospital staff and next of kin, patients 
decide to opt for a living-donor transplant, the OPA will not always be in- 
formed, because the patient does not need to be put on the waiting list. An 
overview of donor kidney flows is given in Fig. 1, which shows that the 
allocation of donor kidneys is in fact the result of three different systems of 
decision-making, applying to kidney flow A, B and C. 
Living-donor kidneys (flow A) are at present mainly allocated by inter- 
action between the patient, the family and the hospital staff. The medical 
results of living-donor kidney transplants are better than those of transplan- 
tation with postmortem kidneys. Moreover the system of decision-making 
implies a certain element of chance, since not all patients in need of a trans- 
plant are in a position to discuss the possibility of a family transplant. Medi- 
cal practice differs considerably in western Europe, because of different 
views on the desirability of using kidneys of related living donors. In the 
United States the use of donor kidneys from non-related living donors has 
been advocated [ 121. There seems to be a need for guidelines covering institu- 
tional responsibilities in allocating those kidneys. 
Living donor 
kidney 
Postmortem donor kidneys 
Intensive care hospital units 
B 
Organ procurement agency 
~. 
Transplant centres 
Patients 
Fig. 1. An overview of donor kidney flows. A: Living-donor kidneys allocated by the hospital staff. B: 
Postmortem donor kidneys allocated directly by the hospital staff. C: Postmortem donor kidneys allocated 
by the Organ Procurement Agency in cooperation with the hospital staff. 
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The most important flow of kidneys in western European countries con- 
cerns postmortem kidneys. The allocation of these kidneys requires a com- 
bination of efficiency and equity considerations. Elster [ 131 reports from the 
American experience that candidates on the waiting list can get points in a 
weighting system in three ways: 
(i) the number of antigens they share with the kidney that is being 
allocated; 
(ii) sensitisation, i.e. the degree to which they have developed antibodies 
against other types of kidney; 
(iii) the time patients have spent on the waiting list. 
The first criterion is an efficiency criterion, since the quality of the match 
relates positively to higher graft survival. The other two criteria can be 
classified as equity criteria. It is hardly possible to decide on the mix between 
efficiency and equity elements in such types of system in an objective way. 
A typical compromise was put forward by Veatch [14], who proposed a 50- 
50 weighing between those two groups of elements. Because the weighing of 
efficiency and equity considerations is arbitrary, this in itself is an argument 
for explicit weighing systems. In that way equal access to transplantation op- 
portunities for patients from different parts of a country, or even a group of 
countries, could be furthered. But uniformity also can invoke irrational 
political processes. In western Europe the system for allocating postmortem 
donor kidneys is discussed within the institutional framework of the OPAs. 
Within Eurotransplant, guidelines have been developed for allocating donor 
kidneys. A special sub-system concerns the provision in this set of guidelines 
that kidneys procured by hospitals in which transplant centres are located do 
have the authority to allocate 50% of those kidneys to a sub-list of their own 
patients. This sub-system of priority setting is pictured in Fig. 1 as flow B. 
4. Decision-making about ‘recruiting donor organs (supply) 
Decision-making about recruiting donor organs is complex. In most 
countries the main resource of donor organs is the bodies of the deceased, 
but an important share of donor organs for kidney transplants is provided 
by living donors. Decision-making about the supply of living-donor organs 
differs substantially from decision-making in the case of postmortem organ 
donation. Two important differences are that decisions about living organ 
donation concern transactions that occur very soon after the decision is 
made, whereas decision-making about postmortem organ donation is often 
characterised by a relatively long time between decision and transaction. So 
in the decision-making process about living organ donation there is a direct 
link between decision and transaction. Often there is even a direct link be- 
tween the supplier of the organ and the patient receiving it. These direct 
links, existing in the case of living organ donation, create a totally different 
decision environment. 
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4.1. Decision-making about the availability of postmortem organs 
Decision-making about postmortem organ donation is indirect decision- 
making. It is decision-making by people who have a near-zero probability 
that their own body will be a source of postmortem organ donation. From 
a population of 15 million in the Netherlands approximately 130 000 died in 
1990. Of those deaths only 55 000 occurred in hospitals [15]. Approximately 
1000 of these hospital deaths were cases in which parts of the body could be 
used as a source of donor organs. So the average probability of any citizen 
donating organs in 1 year is 66 in 1 000 000. Of course if a longer reference 
period is taken a higher probability results; but even then every person think- 
ing about or deciding on postmortem organ donation is, in a statistical sense, 
thinking about donation by other people. Direct personal involvement is 
minimal. This might be an important reason why information and educa- 
tional campaigns about carrying donor cards are so ineffective. 
Decision-making about postmortem organ donation is of course also 
indirect in another way, since it concerns situations occurring after death. 
Decisions about events that one will never experience imply, on logical (or 
psychological) grounds, low involvement. Perception of events after death is 
of a metaphysical, often religious, character. Fear of dying results in a 
tendency for many people not to reflect the concrete events that could occur 
after death. 
The characteristics of indirectness and low involvement for decisions 
about postmortem donation reflect the fact that most people have no person- 
al interest in deciding, on a personal level, about the availability of parts of 
their remains after death. On the other hand, there is very high stake for 
patients suffering from terminal organ failure. The benefits are highly 
valued, because at the societal level health care systems in a developed soci- 
ety place high values on increases in the number of life-years and the quality 
of life. 
The decision by most western European governments to ban market forces 
as instruments for coordinating demand and supply of postmortem donor 
organs should be complemented by an obvious responsibility on those 
governments to replace market forces with other policy instruments and 
coordinating systems. The decision to prohibit the market system changes 
donor organs from an individual marketable good to a collective good [ 161. 
A collective good is a good that, once it is made available, cannot be in- 
dividualised by the price mechanism, since the provision in principle benefits 
everyone. So the cost of production cannot be charged to the individuals who 
benefit from the availability of that good [17]. 
Estimates of the potential availability of donor organs indicate that, per 
million of the population, between 50 and 60 postmortem donor kidneys 
would be suitable for organ donation [18]. The number of donor hearts and 
livers can be estimated at about 25% of that number: between 12.5 and 15 
per million. The number of donor lungs in relation to the number of donor 
kidneys from brain-dead donors is probably even smaller. 
We have to be aware of some aspects of the communication process 
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surrounding death. Death is not an event that is always marked sharply in 
time. There is a time span during which the patient is clearly alive and has 
to be cared for; there is a period during which the state of death has clearly 
been reached; but in between these periods there is often a time span during 
which one is uncertain. Therefore every system in which parts of the mortal 
remains can be used to save lives or to increase the quality of life of patients 
requires a sub-system to decide on the characteristics of the death state. 
While non-heart-beating bodies are clearly and objectively in the death state, 
brain death is a state in which more subtle criteria have to be applied. In the 
medical community in western countries consensus seems to exist about the 
general nature of these criteria. Some arguments are being put forward for 
amending the Uniform Declaration of Death Act, which incorporated pro- 
posals by a Harvard Medical School commission about biomedical criteria 
for the bioethical definition of death [ 191. There may also be some discussion 
about the acceptability of medical actions one would like to perform before 
death when there is an intention to reuse the organs of a non-heart-beating 
donor after death [20]. If one allows for those activities, the number of 
postmortem donor kidneys could be increased by 20-25%. 
Having clearly defined criteria for death in the course of events surroun- 
ding death, there will be moments during which a patient will still be defined 
as living, and later on moments during which death is ‘actual’. It is important 
to be aware of the differences in the position of hospital staff, nurses and 
doctors vis-a-vis the next of kin before and after death. Communication with 
the next of kin before the death of the patient concerns the activities of the 
hospital in the interest of the patient. After death the same or other members 
of the hospital staff have to communicate about the course of events regar- 
ding the mortal remains. 
All western countries have regulations to ensure that this course of events 
is restricted to a number of alternative options. The rights of the next of kin 
concerning the mortal remains are strictly determined by law. If one wants 
to promote postmortem reuse of donor organs, one is required to activate 
communication between the next of kin and the hospital staff about the 
issue. As a consequence of this requirement, hospital staff communication 
with the next of kin changes from measures in the interest of the still-living 
person to communication about the destiny of parts of the mortal remains. 
Before death this communication has to be guided exclusively by concern for 
the health of the patient. After death the hospital staff (in coordination with 
the OPA) are concerned with the interests of one or more patients who could 
be helped by organ donation. Since the next of kin will be grieved by the 
death of their loved one, communication about the mortal remains will be 
emotionally burdensome for them. 
The legal nature of the communication with the next of kin about the 
possibility of re-using the organs differs in different countries. In all cases, 
however, communication in the hours immediately following the patient’s 
death will be overshadowed by complicated and mixed feelings deriving from 
the death crisis. 
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Shortly after death the feelings of the next of kin are often very confused. 
Images of their dead family member will be foremost in their awareness. See- 
ing the mortal remains will intensify these images, and the process of parting 
from their loved one becomes acute. While in a medical sense the mortal re- 
mains of the deceased are depersonalised, it is not probable that the next of 
kin will be in a position to distinguish rationally between the images of the 
person of their deceased family member and the purely physical remains of 
him or her. Therefore it must be expected that the communication with the 
next of kin about reusing organs will almost inevitably be a hardship for 
them. But every system in which re-using the organs is seriously considered 
requires this type of difficult and confusing communication. Whatever the 
exact nature of the legal system involved, this element of confusion cannot 
be avoided and in our view remains part of the reality of donor recruitment. 
Now we will develop a global classilication of systems of postmortem 
donor recruitment. For this classification scheme we use a two-dimensional 
conceptualisation scheme. One dimension concerns the choice that is made 
at societal level about the availability of donor organs, varying from collec- 
tive determinism to an extreme individual point of view. The other dimension 
concerns the activities organised on a routine basis within the hospital system 
to promote - or even to guarantee - maximum communication about the 
option of re-using postmortem organs when medically feasible. An overview 
of the classification scheme is presented in Table 1. 
On the horizontal axis, five systems are distinguished. Which system is op- 
erative depends on the transplant law of the country. In a system of collective 
solidarity, the legal system presupposes that the prohibition of using the 
market system to ensure adequate supply of donor organs has to be compen- 
sated by a legal provision in which all donor organs usable for transplanta- 
tion are available. Underlying this system is the principle that the decision 
about the legality of reusing organs has been made a priori. In this system, 
‘free rider’ behaviour is outlawed and the contribution of every citizen is 
assured. At the other extreme, decision power is completely left to the indi- 
vidual citizens, who, before their death, have to decide on their willingness 
to make their organs available. As far as we know there is no country where 
Table 1 
Systems of decision-making about available postmortem 
Collective Strict Broad Broad Strict 
solidarity opting out opting out opting in opting in 
Hospital organisation 
Legal requirements 
Transplantation 
agents 
Transplant 
coordinators 
Minimal incentives 
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this system is applied in practice. In western European countries and the 
United States the proportion of people carrying donor cards varies between 
10 and 25% [21-231. 
Between the two extremes of complete collective and strict individual 
predisposition, three other systems are distinguished, in which two systems 
are characterised by a legal influence on the decision by the next of kin. In 
a broad opting-in system the next of kin have the authority to ‘opt in’ where 
no evidence of a prior decision by the deceased is available. In a broad 
presumed-consent system the next of kin have the legal authority to refuse 
the re-use of donor organs of the mortal remains of their late family member. 
In a strict opting-out system the law permits the re-using of donor organs in 
all cases where no legal evidence of a decision to opt out is available. In 
western Europe, Belgium, France and Spain have chosen a presumed- 
consent system. In Scandinavia the situation is unclear. All those countries 
opted for a presumed-consent system, but in Sweden the legal basis is in a 
process of reconsideration. The United Kingdom decided for an opting-in 
regime. The situation in Germany at the moment is unclear. The Organ 
Donation Bill for the Netherlands embodies an opting-in system as well. 
In the scheme of decision-making systems about postmortem donor or- 
gans, the vertical axis concerns the decision-making system in the hospitals. 
Which system is in force depends on the transplant law of the country and 
on organisational measures complementing these legal provisions to ensure 
that the opportunity of organ reuse is considered in the greatest proportion 
of the relevant cases. Besides a system with minimal incentives, four other 
options are considered. Transplant coordinators were introduced in many 
countries during the 1980s [24]. A next step would be to guarantee that in 
all hospitals where intensive care units are available, an agent is responsible 
for furthering the consideration of organ procurement in all relevant cases. 
This could be endorsed by legal obligations on hospitals to appoint such a 
coordination officer. One step further would be to introduce legal obliga- 
tions requiring hospitals to request consideration of the option of organ 
reuse in all relevant cases. An extreme variant of this system has been 
introduced in the United States [25-291. This variant - the required request 
system - was not successful, because it was not specific enough. A legal 
obligation was introduced to request a decision on organ reuse for all deaths 
occurring in hospitals. This was considered to be an irrelevant obligation. 
But more specific legal obligations for hospitals could considerably increase 
the number of donor organs and complement either a presumed-consent or 
an opting-in system. In both systems the next of kin have a powerful role. 
Therefore a policy of ensuring an adequate supply of donor organs has to 
develop instruments for ensuring that those options are considered seriously. 
It is presumed that the actual recruitment of donor organs depends on ac- 
tive implementation of policy instruments with respect to both axes in the 
classification scheme. So a policy intending to further recruitment of donor 
organs as much as possible would be characterised by policy measures - 
within a specific framework of legal obligations - according to the upper 
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left corner of the diagram. At the other extreme a combination of a strict 
opting-in system and a hospital sub-system with minimal incentives pictures 
a society in which policy makers see hardly no interest in transplantation. 
There is clearly a trade-off between instruments at both axes in the diagram. 
Collective solidarity systems that are not complemented by an active set of 
policy measures are inefficient, as are strict opting-in systems that are com- 
bined with severe hospital obligations. 
4.2. Decision-making systems about living organ donation 
Decision-making about living organ donation should be viewed as direct 
decision-making. Most kidneys from a living donor are harvested from fami- 
ly members of the recipient. In those cases the donor knows the recipient of 
his or her kidney and will live in his or her neighbourhood. The increase in 
the quality of life resulting from such a family donation will be experienced 
by the donor. If complications occur as a consequence of the donation of the 
kidney, the recipient will experience the reductions in quality of life of the 
donor. 
Kidney donation is relatively safe for the donor. A study on 490 donors 
revealed no mortality and only minor complications [30]. But reliable long- 
term and large-scale studies of medical records are lacking, and a controlled 
comparison with non-donors has not been performed [31]. This is a serious 
lack of information, since animal experiments demonstrated that adverse 
outcomes resulted after nephrectomy in rats after 40% of normal life span, 
which would point to adverse outcomes in humans after approximately thirty 
years. 
The uncertainty about the risks involved in kidney donation for the living 
donor has led to widely differing practices in western European countries 
and the United States. An overview is presented in Table 2. Scandinavian 
countries - especially Norway - show a high proportion of living-donor 
kidney transplants, while in the Netherlands the proportion of living-donor 
kidney transplants is relatively low [32,33]. 
Since family donation results in a high proportion of HLA-identical or 
Table 2 
Kidney transplants per million of the population (pmp) and the percentage of living related dona- 
tions per country, 1990 
Country Transplants 
(pmp) % LRD 
Sweden 
Norway 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
United States 
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nearly identical donors, the medical results for the donor are better than in 
the case of postmortem donors [34]. This raises the question of how the 
interests of the donor must be weighed against those of the recipient. The 
conflicting interests involved do indicate a necessity for legal deliberations 
and perhaps even for formal regulations on the conditions under which living 
organ donation can be considered justifiable. 
In Denmark the legislature was aware of the complications already men- 
tioned. In 1966 it was made explicit that ‘nevertheless, it must be desirable 
to establish the legality of this practice and the conditions under which it can 
take place, in a law.’ Twenty-four years later authorities in the Netherlands 
took the same stand in a policy document on the draft Organ Donation Bill 
[35]. In this document legislation is thought to be necessary to formalise an 
acceptable balance between the need to protect the interests of the living 
donor and the interests of the recipient of the donor organ involved. The 
Dutch legislature decided that the subject should not be left to the supplying 
and receiving parties involved in the donor transaction. Neither was it 
thought acceptable to leave the judgement on the balance of interests to 
physicians treating the patients. 
Organ and tissue removal might involve a risk to the donor. The extent of 
this risk of damage may vary depending on the kind of organ donation. The 
risk is smaller, for example, in the case of a bone marrow donation than 
donation of a kidney or part of the liver. It can be questioned whether the 
law has to formulate explicitly and in detail under which conditions a variety 
of organs and tissues might be removed. Refraining from explicit criteria 
could be considered as a carte blanche. On the other hand, detailed regula- 
tion can be a barrier for unforeseen developments and result in rigidity. 
Legal guidelines of a more general nature, therefore, might be appropriate. 
Even then there are several alternatives to consider. 
The Swedish and the Belgian legislation do not permit living organ dona- 
tion if serious risks to the donor’s health are expected. The Norwegian and 
the Danish legislation are more tolerant in this respect and only forbid living 
organ donation where direct danger to the donor arises. In the Netherlands 
the Organ Donation Bill permits living organ removal even where permanent 
negative health consequences for the donor might occur. But those living 
organ donations are limited to cases where the recipient’s life is in danger and 
as a last resort if other treatment options are not available. 
Transplantation of kidneys from living donors might solve the shortage of 
donor organs for kidney transplantation to a large extent. The issue of using 
kidneys from non-related living donors is at present being discussed [36]. It 
has been demonstrated that graft survival of kidneys mismatched for both 
haplotypes is superior to that of postmortem donor kidneys [37]. 
Living organ donation systems are capable of generating a substantial 
number of donor kidneys. Living organ donation by family members or 
friends is only possible in systems in which dependence between donor and 
recipient exists. The judgement about the acceptability of this inter- 
dependence determines the acceptability of the systems. The success of living 
organ donation in some countries certainly deserves attention. 
5. Conclusion 
Since market forces are deemed unacceptable as instruments for co- 
ordinating demand and supply of donor organs, donor procurement should 
be considered a public good, and governments are faced with the respon- 
sibility of making sure that alternative interaction and distribution 
mechanisms function. The interests of the patients waiting for a transplant 
require that the effectiveness of the wide variety of solutions for donor organ 
recruitment and exchange be the subject of continuing international 
research. 
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